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THE SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE: RAISING THE BAR FOR
THOSE BEHIND BARS
McKune v. Lile, 122 S. Ct. 2017 (2002)
Lauren K. Gralnik"""
Petitioner's Sexual Abuse Treatment Program' required participating
inmates to admit responsibility for past crimes, thereby subjecting
themselves to potential criminal prosecution.2 The rehabilitative program
was aimed at reducing recidivism upon an inmate's release and promoting
public safety.3 Nonparticipation resulted in an inmate's immediate housing
transfer and automatic loss of certain privileges.4 Respondent challenged
the program, alleging that it violated his Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination.5 The district court held that the consequences for not
participating in the program amounted to coercion in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.6 Petitioner appealed the decision and the appellate court
affirmed, holding that the consequences were penalties constituting

* From the bottom of my heart, I would like to thank Ryan Courson for always walking by
my side, rain or shine.
** Editor's Note: This Case Comment received the George W. Milam Award for the best
Case Comment written in the spring of 2003.
I. Petitioner, the warden of the Kansas Department of Corrections, requires inmates
participating in its Sexual Abuse Treatment Program to complete an "Admission ofResponsibility"
form, thus accepting responsibility for the crime for which they have been sentenced. McKune v.
Lile, 122 S. Ct. 2017, 2025 (2002). Participants must also fill out a sexual history form, detailing
prior sexual activities, which may include uncharged criminal offenses. Id. at 2023. Information
provided is verified by a polygraph examination, and discussed in group therapy sessions. Id. at
2023, 2025.
2. Id. at 2025. Information obtained from prisoners is not privileged, and may be used
against them in future criminal proceedings. Id. Additionally, state law requires program staff to
report any uncharged sexual offenses involving minors to appropriate authorities. Id. at 2023.
3. Id. at 2024. The Court noted that convicted sex offenders reentering society "are much
more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault." Id.
4. Id. at 2023. Respondent's refusal to participate in the program would result in an
immediate housing transfer from a medium-security unit to a maximum-security unit, where his
movement would be more limited; he would reside in a four-person cell rather than a two-person
cell, and generally be in a more dangerous environment. Id.As a result of the automatic reduction
in privilege status from Level III to Level I, Respondent's visitation rights, earnings, work
opportunities, ability to send money to family, canteen expenditures, and television access would
be limited. Id.
5. Id. The Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause provides that "[n]o person ... shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. Lile v. McKune, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1157 (D. Kan. 1998).
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compulsion.7 The Supreme Court granted certiorari,' and in reversing the
appellate court's decision, HELD, that offering prisoners incentives to
participate in the program did not amount to compulsion prohibited by the
Fifth Amendment. 9
The Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause provides that "[n]o
person.., shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.' Courts analyze self-incrimination claims by assessing whether
a consequence of invoking the privilege is severe enough to constitute
compulsion." Typically, the use made of the invocation and the timing of
its consequences aid in determining whether one has been
unconstitutionally compelled. 2
In Baxter v. Palmigiano,3 the Court considered whether the Fifth
Amendment prohibited drawing adverse inferences against an inmate for
his failure to testify at a prison disciplinary hearing. 4 The Court stated that
an adverse inference drawn from an inmate's silence must be balanced
with other factors. 5 Accordingly, the Court assessed the consequence
imposed on the inmate, based on his silence and independent evidence of
his guilt, and held that no constitutional violation had occurred. 6
The Court added that an inmate's mere invocation of the privilege
would not justify an automatic penalty." The Court also noted that the
State could avoid a constitutional violation by offering an inmate use
immunity, thereby waiving prosecution in exchange for desired

7. Lile v. McKune, 224 F.3d 1175, 1189 (10th Cir. 2001).
8. 532 U.S. 1018 (2001). The Court stated that the issue was whether Petitioner's program
and the consequences imposed for nonparticipation combine to create unconstitutional compulsion.
McKune, 122 S.Ct. at 2025.
9. McKune, 122 S.Ct. at 2032.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11. See, e.g., McKune, 122 S. Ct. at 2025 (discussing whether the consequence of invocation
of the self-incrimination privilege created a compulsion that encumbered a constitutional right).
12. See id. at 2037-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (surveying prior self-incrimination cases).
13. 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
14. Id. at316.
15. See id.at 318. This balancing considered the granting of use immunity for selfincriminating statements, the possibility of a consequence that does not automatically follow from
invocation of the privilege, and independent evidence to sustain a conviction. See id.
16. Id. at 320. The Court further remarked that prior to the disciplinary hearing, the inmate
was given copies of the Inmate Disciplinary Report and the superior's investigation report,
containing the charges and evidence against him. Id. at 320 n.4. The fact that the inmate chose to
remain silent at the hearing, the two reports, and supplementary reports were factors given equal
weight in the Disciplinary Board's decision to place him in punitive segregation for thirty days. See
id.
17. Id. at 317; see also Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation of NY.,
392 U.S. 280, 283 (1968) (holding that dismissal of public employees solely for invoking their
constitutional right against self-incrimination violated the Constitution).
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testimony. 8 However, the Court did not define a precise test to identify the
consequences that compel self-incrimination in a prison environment. 9
Subsequently, in Sandin v. Conner,2" the Court formulated a standard
to determine the constitutionality of prison regulations under the Due
Process Clause.2 The Court analyzed whether state prison regulations22 or
the Due Process Clause itself afforded inmates a liberty interest in
remaining free from solitary confinement. 3 Holding that neither provided
the inmate with a protected liberty interest,24 the Court enunciated a
framework for analyzing prisoners' due process rights.25
The Court recognized a constitutional violation as one that "imposes
[an] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
' The Court found that the consequence
ordinary incidents of prison life."26
imposed on the inmate did not markedly differ from aspects of ordinary
prison confinement. 7 Therefore, the Court held that the inmate's due

18. Baxter, 425 U.S. at 318. Use immunity prevents the State from using an inmate's own
words against him in a subsequent prosecution. See McKune v. Lile, 122 S.Ct. 2017, 2044 (2002)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Alternatively, transactional immunity prevents the State from prosecuting
an inmate altogether. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
19. See Baxter, 425 U.S. at 325-40 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (comparing prior Fifth
Amendment cases to the Court's holding).
20. 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
21. Id. at 484. The Due Process Clause states that "[n]o person shall be... deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
22. The text of the regulation read:
Upon completion of the hearing, the committee may take the matter under
advisement and render a decision based upon evidence presented at the hearing
to which the individual had an opportunity to respond or any cumulative evidence
which may subsequently come to light may be used as a permissible inference of
guilt, although disciplinary action shall be based upon more than mere silence. A
finding of guilt shall be made where:
(I) The inmate or ward admits the violation or pleads guilty.
(2) The charge is supportedby substantialevidence.
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 477 n.3 (alteration in original) (quoting Haw. Admin. R. § 17-201-18(b)(2)
(1983)).
23. Id. at 477. The Court recognized that states may, under certain circumstances, create
liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause. Id.
at 484. However, the Court also stated that
these interests would generally be "limited to freedom from restraint [that] imposes [an] atypical
and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Id.
24. Id. at 486.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 484.
27. Id. at 486. The Court explained that disciplinary segregation mirrored the conditions
imposed upon inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody, and that inmates in the
general population received "significant amounts of 'lockdown time."' Id. Hence, the Court noted
that thirty days in solitary confinement did not significantly alter the inmate's actual sentence. See
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process rights were not violated because no liberty interest was
implicated."
Despite the available test set forth in Sandin, the Court in Ohio Adult
ParoleAuthority v. Woodard29 used Baxter to evaluate whether prison
clemency procedures violated an inmate's Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination." The Court observed that, because the inmate's
participation in the clemency interview was voluntary, adverse inferences
drawn from his silence would not amount to compulsion.3 Likewise, any
pressure the inmate felt to speak to improve his chances for clemency
would not make the interview compelled.32
The Court noted that, although the State did not grant immunity for
statements made during the interview, the inmate's silence would not
necessarily result in prosecution for other crimes or a denial of clemency.33
Rather, the clemency board retained the discretion to draw adverse
inferences against the inmate.34 The Court balanced the inmate's choice
with the possible consequence of his participation and held that the
clemency procedures did not violate the Self-Incrimination Clause.35
Although the plurality in the instant Court acknowledged the factors
discussed in Baxter and Woodard, it applied the Sandin analysis to
determine whether Petitioner's program violated Respondent's right
against self-incrimination.36 Conceding that Sandin did not provide a
precise parallel to determine whether a consequence of invoking the
privilege amounted to compulsion, the instant Court nonetheless stated that
Sandin provided useful instruction.37 The instant Court held that the

id.
28. Id. at 486.
29. 523 U.S. 272 (1998).
30. Id. at 286. The Court first determined that the inmate's due process was not violated by
the State's clemency procedures before addressing the self-incrimination claim. Id. at 275.
31. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
32. Woodard, 523 U.S. at 286.
33. See id. The inmate's choice to answer questions during the clemency interview could
possibly subject him to the risk of incrimination because ofconcurrent post-conviction proceedings.
See id. at 285.
34. See id. at 286. Because the inmate retained a choice in participating in the interview, any
consequence flowing from his decision was possible, but not automatic. See id. Although the
adverse inferences drawn from the inmate's silence could ultimately lead to his execution, the Court
noted that the use made of an inmate's refusal to answer questions was unclear. See id.
35. See id. The Court likened the inmate's choice to participate in the clemency interview
to the choices criminal defendants must routinely make. Id.
36. McKune v. Lile, 122 S. Ct. 2017, 2027-28 (2002).
37. Id. at 2026-27. The Court used Sandin to support its assertion that a convicted felon's life
in prison differs from that of an ordinary citizen. Id. at 2027. Furthermore, the Court stated that in
the prison context, the Fifth Amendment-compulsion inquiry must consider the significant restraints

already inherent in prison life. Id.
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consequences Respondent faced for his silence did not constitute
unconstitutional compulsion.3"
Furthermore, the plurality noted that the compulsion inquiry must
consider the significant restraints already inherent in prison life balanced
against the State's interests in rehabilitation and prison procedures.3 9
Consequently, the instant Court upheld the program's automatic
sanctions.40 The instant Court classified participation in the program as
voluntary, and viewed the consequences of nonparticipation as incidental
to the program's legitimate penological purpose.4 Moreover, the instant
Court did not consider the consequences that Respondent faced as
penalties.42
Applying Sandin's atypical and significant hardship standard, the
plurality characterized Petitioner's program as offering incentives to
participants.43 The instant Court noted that inmates regularly experienced
the types of consequences imposed on non-participants.44 Thus, the instant
Court held that Petitioner's program, and the automatic consequences
following the choice not to participate, did not violate Respondent's Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination.45
Concurring in the final judgment, Justice O'Connor stated that the
Sandin standard was inappropriate for evaluating a self-incrimination
claim.46 Although noting that the instant case involved burdens rather than
benefits, Justice O'Connor concluded that the penalties imposed were not
harsh enough to constitute compulsion under any reasonable test.47 Justice
O'Connor further stated that the proper analysis should recognize that the

38. Id. at 2030.
39. See id. at 2027.
40. Id. at 2030. Immediate sanctions included a housing transfer to a more restrictive unit,
limited mobility within that unit, and a reduction in privilege status. Id. at 2023.
41. See id. at 2027.
42. See id. at 2028-30. The Court noted that "[t]here is no indication that the [program] is an
elaborate attempt to avoid the protections offered by the privilege against compelled selfincrimination." Id. at 2028. Further, the Court suggested that the State's legitimate interests
trumped the program's incidental burden on an inmate's right to remain silent. See id.
43. See id. at 2032. The Court defined the choice to participate as deciding between losing
prison privileges and accepting responsibility for past crimes. Id. at 2030. The Court then deemphasized any distinction Respondent might make between offering a reward for participation
and imposing a penalty for nonparticipation. See id. at 2031.
44. See id. Labeling Respondent's medium-security housing as an "illusory baseline," the
Court gave a detailed example to illustrate the random nature of prison housing assignments. See

id.
45. Id. at 2032.
46. See id. at 2035 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 2034-35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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risk of punishment may be great, so long as the actual punishment is
imposed through a fair criminal process.4"
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, argued that the plurality improperly appraised the
program's mandatory sanctions as minimal incentives.49 Moreover, Justice
Stevens disagreed with the notion that Respondent's consequences for
invoking the privilege were not significant enough to compel selfincrimination. 0 Specifically, Justice Stevens discussed the dignitary and
reputational harms imposed by a housing transfer and loss of privileges."1
Justice Stevens asserted that Respondent's consequential burden should be
gauged by his settled expectations regarding the conditions of his
confinement." Furthermore, Justice Stevens suggested that the plurality
disregarded prior precedent, using Respondent's prisoner status to require
a heightened showing of compulsion."
By upholding Petitioner's program using the Sandin analysis, the
instant Court narrows the scope of prisoners' constitutional rights as
recognized by prior Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. 4 Although
mentioning Baxter and Woodard in its analysis, the instant Court
emphasizes extrinsic factors in determining that Petitioner's program does
not unconstitutionally compel self-incrimination." Particularly, the instant

48. See id. at 2035 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183,
213 (1971)).
49. Id. at 2036 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 2040 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51. See id. at 2040-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that the loss of
privileges imposed on nonparticipating inmates was also imposed on inmates for serious
disciplinary infractions. Id. at 2040 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Petitioner's Internal Management
Policy and Procedure I 1-101 provides that an inmate
shall be automatically reduced to Level I for any of the following: (1) Termination
from a work or program assignment for cause; (2) Refusal to participate in
recommended programs at the time of placement; (3) Offenses committed in
which a felony charge is filed with the district or county prosecutor; (4)
Disciplinary convictions for: (a) Theft; (b) Being in a condition of drunkenness,
intoxication, or a state of altered consciousness; (c) Use of stimulants, sedatives,
unauthorized drugs, or narcotics, or the misuse, or hoarding of authorized or
prescribed medication; (d) Sodomy, aggravated sodomy, or aggravated sexual act;
(e) Riot or incitement to riot; (f) Arson; (g) Assault; (h) Battery; (i) Inmate
Activity (limitations); (j) Sexual Activity; (k) Interference with Restraints; (I)
Relationships with Staff; (in) Work Performance; or (n) Dangerous Contraband.
Id. at 2040 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 2041 (Stevens, J., dissenting),
53. Id. at 2038 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. See id. at 2043 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. See id. at 2027-30. The Court initially used Baxter to illustrate its contention that
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Court stresses the uncertain nature of prison life and the vital State
interests in rehabilitating prisoners and maintaining prison authority to
reach its decision.56
The instant Court gives minimal weight to Baxter's requirement that
granting use immunity in exchange for desired self-incriminating
information is necessary to avoid violating the Fifth Amendment.57 Under
Baxter, Petitioner's program should afford participants the requisite
protection in exchange for their mandatory confessions. 58 The instant
Court arguably ignores this requirement, focusing on the program's
legitimate penological purpose rather than the risk of prosecution imposed
on participants.59
Furthermore, the instant Court minimizes the immediacy of the housing
transfer and loss of privilege status upon an inmate's invocation of the
privilege. 6' The instant Court labels the transfer to maximum security as
incidental to the program's needs, 6' rather than as punitive.62 Referring to
the Sandin axiom that inmates must expect fewer privileges than free
citizens, 61 the instant Court avoids fully analyzing the factors considered
in Baxter.64 A more thorough analysis of Baxter would likely lead the
instant Court to reach a different conclusion.65
In Baxter, temporary punitive segregation was imposed only after
independent evidence of the inmate's guilt was presented and weighed

incarceration places limitations on a prisoner's exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination.
See id. at 2027. Furthermore, the Court stated that the automatic nature of Respondent's
consequences for nonparticipation is not a sufficient reason to ignore Woodard and Baxter, where
the consequences imposed did not automatically follow the inmate's invocation of the privilege.
See id. at 2030.
56. See id. at 2028.
57. See id. at 2032; see also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976).
58. See supranote 18 and accompanying text. The State offered two reasons for not granting
immunity to participants of Petitioner's program. McKune, 122 S.Ct. at 2025. First, the State wants
participants to accept full responsibility for their past actions, thus accepting that those actions carry
consequences. Id. Second, the State confirms its valid interest in deterrence by keeping open the
option to prosecute a particularly dangerous offender. Id. The Court noted that although
incriminating evidence had never been disclosed under the program, state law requires the program
staff to report any uncharged sexual offenses involving minors to law enforcement authorities. Id.
at 2023.
59. See id. at 2027. But cf id.at 2043 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that because State
interests in law enforcement and rehabilitation are ever-present, using them tojustify infringing on
an inmate's Fifth Amendment right would do away with the right itself).
60. See id. at 2027.
61. Id. The Court explained that inmates who choose not to participate in the program are
moved out of the facility where the programs are held to make room for participating inmates. Id.
62. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
63. See McKune, 122 S.Ct. at 2027.
64. See id. at 2030.
65. See id. at 2039, 2044-45 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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equally with an adverse inference drawn from his silence.66 Arguably, a
permanent transfer to maximum security imposed immediately upon
invoking the privilege against self-incrimination is a more severe
consequence. 67 However, the instant Court overemphasizes Respondent's
inmate status and concludes that he should be accustomed to housing
transfers and changes in privileges,68 thus minimizing the rights that
Baxter recognizes.69
The instant Court departs not only from the reasoning of Baxter, but
also from the reasoning of Woodard.7" Comparing Respondent's loss of
privileges with the possible execution in Woodard, the instant Court
determines that Respondent's consequences are too mild to constitute
compulsion.7 It is debatable whether the instant Court fully accounts for
the certainty of Respondent's consequences in its analysis.72
Although Respondent faced an automatic reduction in privileges and
an immediate housing transfer for invoking the privilege, the instant Court
emphasizes the voluntary nature of Petitioner's program.73 The instant
Court likens Respondent's decision to participate in the program to the
inmate's choice to participate in the clemency interview in Woodard.74 The
instant Court seemingly strays from Woodard's analysis, couching its
conclusion in terms of choices rather than consequences.75
In the instant case, Respondent was guaranteed to automatically lose
his privilege status and be transferred to a maximum-security unit upon
refusal to participate in Petitioner's program.76 The instant Court describes
the hardships Respondent faced for nonparticipation as de minimus harms,
and disregards the dangerousness of the maximum-security unit.77 Hence,
the instant Court seems complacent, permitting more than the allowable

66. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
68. See McKune, 122 S. Ct. at 203 1.
69. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 16 & 35 and accompanying text.
71. See McKune, 122 S. Ct. at 2030.
72. See id. at 2029-30.
73. See text accompanying note 41. The language of the Court in labeling Petitioner's
program as voluntary is particularly illustrative of its reasoning: "If respondent was not compelled
to participate in the [program], his participation was voluntary in the only sense necessary for our
present inquiry." See McKune, 122 S. Ct. at 2030.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
77. See McKune, 122 S. Ct. at 2028-29. Respondent explained that in the maximum-security
unit, more gang activity occurs, reported and unreported rapes of inmates are more prevalent, and
sex offenders are seen as targets for rape and physical and mental assaults. Id. at 2041 n.9 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
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adverse inferences of Baxter and Woodardto be drawn against an inmate
confronted with the choice to participate in Petitioner's program.78
Additionally, Woodard, a post-Sandin decision, indicates that the
Sandin standard was meant to apply only to due process claims and not to
self-incrimination cases.79 In Woodard, the inmate brought a due process
claim and a self-incrimination claim.8" The Court discussed each claim
separately, noting Sandin only in its due process analysis.8' Had Sandin
been intended to offer a broad framework to analyze inmates'
constitutional claims, logic would dictate that the Court apply the atypical
and significant hardship standard to both claims raised in Woodard.82
Justice O'Connor's concurrence and Justice Stevens' dissent in the instant
case also demonstrate that five of nine Supreme Court justices agree that
Sandin is not the appropriate test for evaluating self-incrimination claims.83
Thus, the plurality in the instant case presumably utilized Sandin only
to convey that inmates do not have as many constitutional rights as free
citizens." Focusing on the State's interests in reducing recidivism,
increasing public safety, and strengthening prison administration, the
instant Court discounts the factors applied in prior self-incrimination
cases.85 It is questionable whether Petitioner's program would be held
constitutional applying existing Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.86 Hence,
the instant Court's holding may be interpreted as being clouded by a policy
judgment favoring a stronger prison system.8 7 The instant Court's
reluctance to follow its own precedent dangerously broadens the scope of
Sandin and jeopardizes inmates' constitutional rights. 8

78. See id. at 2036 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
82. See McKune, 122 S. Ct. at 2038 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. See supra notes 46 & 53 and accompanying text.
84. See McKune, 122 S. Ct. at 2027.
85. See id at 2036 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the plurality's policy judgment
does not justify the evisceration of a constitutional right").
86. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the plurality's analysis as a "meandering
attempt to justify its unprecedented departure from arule of law that has been settled since the days
of John Marshall").
87. See Gina Holland, Court Reviews Sex Offenders Rights, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2001,
availableat http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A30141-200 INov28?language=printer
(stating that the Bush administration and other states want the Supreme Court justices to use the
instant case to extend prison authority).
88. See id. (suggesting that other states will expand their sex offender treatment programs in
response to the instant Court's holding).
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